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ABSTRACT
The study of various indicators of nuclear proliferation actions by states can
identify the associated level of risk. This study expands upon previous proliferation
risk work by investigating the number of Enrichment and Reprocessing facilities
a state has based on various historical indicators. These indicators include: (a)
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Per Capita, (b) Nuclear Electricity Production, (c)
Possession of Nuclear Weapons, (d) Superpower Alliance, (e) Technical Capabilities,
(f) number of Rival ENR facilities, and (g) number of ENR facilities held by a trading
partner. ENR facilities are a vital part of the nuclear fuel cycle, regardless of intent
be it civilian electricity production or weapons production. The number of ENR
facilities is important to measure, as this provides information regarding a state’s
urgency and reasoning for a weapons program.
Data, from A Spatial Model of Nuclear Technology Diffusion by M. Fuhrmann and
B. Tkach, is utilized to develop a predictive model. This dataset includes state data
from 1945-2010, for 56 countries that had at least one operational research reactor.
From the aforementioned indicators, both the number of Rival ENR facilities and
number of ENR facilities held by a trading partner accounted for spatial clustering
of nuclear weapons programs. Spatial clustering provided the opportunity to capture
the dynamic nature of proliferation.
Bayesian networks were used as the investigative tool for this study. These net-
works are directed acyclic graphs that provide the ability to represent conditional
dependence relationships between sets of random variables. This provides the ability
to use information about the state of a random variable to infer additional informa-
tion about the other random variable. Bayesian networks allow for a more visual
approach to developing joint distributions of all important variables that model a
ii
system. In most cases, there is a plethora of data for Bayesian networks to be con-
structed from. It is possible to inform these networks through expert judgement.
However, due to the limited data available for nuclear weapons history, expert judg-
ments are also required to ensure model specification.
From this study, it was evident that Bayesian networks were an appropriate
tool to capture the dynamics of a potential proliferation threat and the level of
proliferation risk. However, due to the complexity behind nuclear weapons programs
there is always an opportunity for future work. The results from this study compared
favorably to the historical data from Fuhrmann and Tkach, with some potential for
better prediction accuracy. Refined models, with a higher validation rate with respect
to historical data, can be used as a policy tool. These refined models will have the
capability to forecast.
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NOMENCLATURE
AVLIS Atomic Vapor Laser Isotope Separation
CPT Conditional Probability Table
EM Expectation - Maximization
EMIS Electromagnetic Isotope Separation
ENR Enrichment and Reprocessing Facilities
F&T Fuhrmann and Tkach datset
FP Fisson Products
GD Gradient Descent
GDP Gross Domestic Product
HEU Highly Enriched Uranium
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
LEU Low Enriched Uranium
MLIS Molecular Laser Isotope Separation
NFC Nuclear Fuel Cycle
NPT Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
PUREX Plutonium Uranium Redox Extraction
SNM Special Nuclear Material
SWU Separative Work Unit
THOREX Thorium Extraction
TRU Transuranics
UREX Uranium Extraction
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1. INTRODUCTION
The advent of the nuclear age brought with it both peaceful and non-peaceful
nuclear applications. The spread of nuclear weapons technology began in the early
stages of World War II. Currently, nine states have nuclear weapons and multiple
other states possess the capabilities to start a nuclear weapons program. Only five
states are recognized as nuclear weapons states per the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT); United States (1945), Russia (1949), United Kingdom (1952), France
(1960), and China (1964). There are four other states that possess nuclear weapons:
India (1974), Israel (N/A), North Korea (2006) and Pakistan (1998). [1] Additional
states that pursued nuclear weapons programs include Iran, Libya, South Africa and
Syria. Besides accounting for current nuclear weapons states, it is also important
to recognize when states initiated a nuclear weapons program, even if the program
has since failed or ceased. There are thirteen cases identifying decisions to initiate a
nuclear weapons programs predating 1975. According to Meyer, a nuclear weapons
program initiation is defined by an explicit governmental decision. [2] In this mod-
ern age, technical capabilities are continuously improving. As a result the threat
of nuclear weapons proliferation is at an all time high. However, various security
protocols such as the NPT and Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and organi-
zations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency have curbed major potential
threats.
“There are indications because of new inventions, that 10, 15, or 20 nations will
have a nuclear capacity, including Red China, by the end of the Presidential office in
1964. This is extremely serious...I think the fate not only of our own civilization, but
I think the fate of world and the future of the human race, is involved in preventing
a nuclear war.” [3] From President Kennedy’s remarks above, it was (and is) obvious
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that nuclear weapons will always be of concern to states on the global stage. The
spread of nuclear weapons signaled the importance to globally emphasize the need
for nuclear security and non-proliferation. Currently, nuclear weapons proliferation
is the focal point of security concerns. [4] Nuclear weapons proliferation can severely
impact strategic planning and have security implications regionally and globally [5].
Thus, it has become increasingly important to study nuclear security and nuclear
proliferation risk.
1.1 Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Nuclear opportunity and Nuclear willingness are key to nuclear weapons prolif-
eration. [4] Nuclear opportunity represents a state’s capability to develop nuclear
weapons, while nuclear willingness represents a state’s motivation. Motivation can
determine whether a state poses a credible threat, while technical capability mea-
sures whether a state can accomplish its goals. Therefore, it must be noted that
proliferation decisions stem from a combination of technical capabilities and motiva-
tion(s).
There are two primary schools of thought regarding nuclear weapons proliferation,
realist and idealist philosophies. Realism relies on the hypothesis that states acquire
nuclear weapons because their security demands it [6]. The realist point of view
focuses on the fact “friends today may become enemies tomorrow” [7]. Thus, based
on this ideology, the driving factor for development is the technical capability of a
state [8]. President Kennedy used the realist ideology, when predicting that 15-20
countries would have nuclear weapons by 1975 [9]. However, historical examples
suggest that the realist ideology is a poor representation of proliferation decisions.
President Kennedy’s quote is a prime example of how this ideology over-predicts
proliferation decisions. The failure of realism to explain proliferation, led to further
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thought being placed on idealism [10].
Idealism relies on the belief that proliferation decisions are dependent on multiple
factors and not just dependent on security alone. Idealism represents the demand
side of proliferation, while realism represents the supply side of proliferation [10]
[6]. Idealism can be applied to three different levels: international, domestic and
the individual level. Each level can impact proliferation decisions differently, thus
highlighting how complex the proliferation decision process can be. These levels can
also be used to assess whether a state is more likely to proliferate. Idealists stress
the importance of meeting international standards by highlighting the importance of
non-proliferation treaties. Idealism suggests that states should be punished if they
do not abide by international norms, to prevent proliferation. However, there have
been historical cases where such logic has backfired. It is also true that societies
that promote openness are more likely to reject the idea of a weapons program [11].
While secretive societies are more likely to pursue a weapons program [7]. The
individual level looks into trends of the leader of a state. Charles de Gaulle is an
example of how individuals dictate proliferation decisions. Gaulle was very keen on
developing a sense of independence and ensuring French sovereignty, based on the
result of previous wars. [12] Therefore, Charles de Gaulle is one of a handful of leaders
that highlight the importance of recognizing the individual level when considering
non-proliferation theories.
It is also important to recognize the different types of proliferation, vertical and
horizontal. Horizontal proliferation refers to non-nuclear states and their attempt to
acquire nuclear weapons. Whereas vertical proliferation refers to nuclear weapons
states attempting to increase their stockpiles and capabilities. The current status
of the nuclear regime dictates that horizontal proliferation is of a higher concern
than vertical proliferation. However, with the cold war serving as a prime exam-
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ple of vertical proliferation it is evident that both types hold equal importance in
global security [13]. The majority of nuclear proliferation research aims to study the
determinants of horizontal nuclear proliferation.
There have been varying arguments reasoning why horizontal proliferation is of
higher importance. Some have pointed to the near absence of major war in the
nuclear era as evidence that nuclear weapons proliferation is beneficial [14]. Authors
like Mueller argue that nuclear weapons and the absence of major war is merely
coincidental [15]. The arguments made by these authors sheds light on their stance
between realism and idealism. Unfortunately, nuclear weapons proliferation is quite
fickle, and requires individual case studies to understand the complexity behind
proliferation decisions.
The chances of nuclear war should increase, with the increase of horizontal pro-
liferation. By definition at least one state in a war should use nuclear weapon(s)
for it to be deemed a “nuclear war”. However the consequences of nuclear weapons
may cause states to be less likely to engage in war. This would indirectly promote
horizontal proliferation, directly asserting the concept of deterrence theory. It is
interesting to note that an increase in nuclear stockpiles could deter other nations
from proliferation.
1.2 Objectives and Motivations
The overall goal of this study is to estimate the number of Enrichment and
Reprocessing (ENR) facilities a state has. This goal will be achieved through the
following objectives:
1. Develop Bayesian network(s) that estimate the number of ENR facilities a state
has at a specific point in time based on input parameters.
(a) This network should reproduce historical examples and incorporate the
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potential to forecast.
(b) Develop multiple networks, by using different learning methods.
(c) Validate network(s) for the following historical examples:
i. Brazil,
ii. India,
iii. South Africa, and
iv. Sweden.
2. Conduct an expert elicitation to better understand the role of different indica-
tors in the development of a state’s ENR facilities.
3. Conduct a sensitivity analysis on the network(s) developed.
(a) Identify factors towards nuclear weapons proliferation and ensure they are
modeled by the represented nodes.
(b) Identify whether certain factors in nuclear weapons proliferation are de-
pendent on one another. Ensure that dependence is shown in the network.
(c) Determine the predicted effect of each node(s) on the dependent variable.
(d) Smooth data by merging yearly data into sets of x (number) years. De-
termine the appropriate number of years to subset.
(e) Estimate the uncertainty in the number of ENR facilities’ by varying the
historical ENR facilities data set.
Each objective is key in achieving the overall goal. The first two objectives aim to
develop the predictive nature of the model. The third objective studies sensitivities
in the model, enabling the option for future use. These developed models can be
further refined to forecast ENR developments, highlighting its use as a policy tool.
5
1.3 Previous Work
Previous work has been conducted on nuclear weapons proliferation determina-
tion. Before discussing previous work, it is important to recognize potential pitfalls
when predicting proliferation. According to Montgomery and Sagan [16], there are
five serious problems. First and foremost, there is ambiguity surrounding initiation
and completion dates for nuclear programs. Next, methodologies and data sets are
generally chosen for convenience instead of there relation to empirical questions asked
in the study. Independent variables chosen for proliferation studies overlook impor-
tant factors such as prestige, and bureaucracies. Additionally, findings can ignore
data that is crucial to policy making. [16] A thorough review of the literature was
used to provide background information whilst considering potential pitfalls.
Work done by Corey Freeman and Mike Mella (at Texas A&M) involved compu-
tational networks to assess proliferation determination [5] [10]. Freeman developed
the original Bayesian network to test the following hypothesis, a state’s motivations
directly affect intention’s, which in turn led to the proliferation pathways chosen.
The Freeman network had flexibility as it tested for both states and non-state ac-
tors. Freeman’s work found that motivations determined pathways, while capabilities
affected the success rate. This work established the relative threat an adversary can
pose [10]. Mella expanded upon the Freeman’s network in a couple of ways. The
network was refined to yield the most likely path a state would pursue in developing
nuclear weapons. Additionally, the networks also included dual-use export controlled
technologies to better assess state pathways [5]. This expanded network was tested
for various historical examples. Both networks were successful in predicting prolifer-
ation pathways based on a number of different factors. However, both Freeman and
Mella made multiple suggestions to improve upon their work respectively [5] [10].
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Some suggestions include: conducting expert elicitations, including de-motivating
factors, and testing more historical cases. A plethora of nuclear weapons prolifer-
ation studies provide insight on potential motivators, but do not seem to capture
de-motivating factors [10]. The notion for recommending expert elicitations was to
improve upon weighting factors used by Bayesian network software [5].
Other proliferation risk work utilized logistic models to asses both the nuclear
opportunity and nuclear willingness factors. Papers in the Journal of Conflict Reso-
lution, discuss potential indicators for nuclear proliferation [4]. Jo and Gartzke take
a similar approach to the Singh and Way article, but two dependent variables are
evaluated. The Jo and Gartzke study identifies whether a state has a program, and
a weapon. Additionally, both the Jo and Gartzke and Singh and Way studies avoid
defining classifying nodes but instead determine the dependent variables as a func-
tion of all listed independent variables. Finally, the Jo and Gartzke study continues
to study the independent variables in groups based on its class (technical capability
or motivation) [17].
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2. NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE
A review of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle (NFC) is made in this chapter for familiariza-
tion with the ENR facility definition used for this study. This study associates the
development of ENR facilities with a states proliferation status. ENR facilities for
this study are deemed to be sensitive technologies and correlates of nuclear weapons
proliferation. Some states develop weapons capability, but avoid proliferating unless
motivated to do so, more commonly known as nuclear hedging [18].
Special Nuclear Material (SNM) and source material of interest for proliferation
include plutonium, uranium, and thorium. The NFC is the path followed by nuclear
material during its use through a system of interconnected nuclear facilities. It starts
with mining of ore and concludes with disposal of waste. All stages of the NFC can
be seen in Figure 2.1. Additionally, it is important to note that there are two types
of cycles, open and closed [19]. If spent fuel is not reprocessed then the cycle is
classified as an open fuel cycle, whereas if spent fuel is recycled or reprocessed then
it is classified as a closed fuel cycle.
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Figure 2.1: Stages of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle. Reprinted from [20]
The front-end of the NFC consists of five stages prior to fuel entering the reactor.
The first stage is to mine and mill uranium and thorium from the ground. There
are four different methods to mine: open-pit mining, underground mining, in-situ
leaching, and by-product mining. Following the mining, material will be milled
to extract uranium from mined ore. Generally speaking, mining and milling are
considered one stage, since most facilities have the capability to extract and mill
material. The resulting material, concentrated in U3O8 (yellowcake), is shipped to
a conversion facility. Conversion facilities convert U3O8 to UF6 gas, which is then
shipped to a uranium enrichment facility.
Traditional nuclear fuel requires uranium that is slightly enriched in 235U . Nat-
ural uranium contains 99.28% of 238U , 0.711% of 235U , and 0.006% of 234U . Nuclear
fuel used in light water reactors requires uranium to have a concentration varying
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between 2% to 5% of 235U . Enrichment process uses different isotope separation
techniques to increases the concentration of 235U relative to 238U . The most com-
monly used enrichment technologies are gaseous diffusion, gas centrifuge, and to a
limited extent Atomic Vapor Laser Isotope Separation (AVLIS). Some other enrich-
ment technologies include aerodynamic vortex tube, aerodynamic separation nozzle,
chemical exchange, ion exchange, laser molecular separation, and electromagnetic
isotope separation. Once the uranium is enriched, it is passed to a fuel fabrication
facility. Fuel fabrication facilities take the enriched uranium and develop fuel assem-
blies. A fuel assembly is a column of ceramic fuel pellets made of uranium oxide or
mixed-oxide and clad. Each assembly is sealed with zirconium alloy. Fuel fabrication
marks the last stage of the front end of the fuel cycle.
The back-end of the NFC consists of all stages after fuel leaves the reactor (trans-
muter). Depending on the type of cycle (open or closed), the number of stages in the
back end of the NFC can vary. In an open cycle, fuel from the reactor is stored in
a spent fuel pool. After which, the fuel is taken from the spent fuel pool and stored
in dry casks. These dry casks are sent to high level waste management facilities.
In a closed cycle, the first stage in the back-end is fuel reprocessing. Reprocessing
recovers uranium and plutonium isotopes from the used fuel. The second stage in-
volves either uranium or plutonium conversion. Finally, the material is sent to either
enrichment or fuel fabrication facilities, concluding the fuel cycle.
2.1 Weapons Development in Nuclear Fuel Cycle
The two most commonly known types of nuclear fission weapons are gun-type and
implosion type weapons. Both of these require a mass of fissile material (enriched
uranium or plutonium). This mass is assembled in such a way that it can start an
uncontrolled nuclear chain reaction (supercritical mass). In gun-type weapons, a
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piece of sub-critical material is shot into another to initiate this reaction. Whereas,
implosion type weapons compress the sub-critical material through the use of lenses,
a spherical shell of high explosives. Let it be noted that gun-type weapons can use
highly enriched, around 90% or higher, 235U or 239Pu; implosion-type weapons can
use either 239Pu or 235U . Note that uranium based implosion-type weapons are
difficult to manufacture. Nuclear weapons can be made out of any SNM, highly
enriched uranium (HEU), 233U , 239Pu, and 241Pu. Therefore, peaceful applications
of nuclear energy can shorten breakout time, thus increasing a state’s capability to
proliferate [21]. Breakout time is defined as the amount of time required to produce
enough weapons-grade material for one weapon.
While the aforementioned are the most common types of nuclear weapons, there
are a number of other categories of nuclear weapons. States pursuing a program will
normally aim to achieve nuclear capability in the most feasible way possible. It is
easier to achieve such a goal with traditional nuclear weapons as there is a known
track record for these types of weapons (gun and implosion type).
2.1.1 Enrichment
It is important to study enrichment facilities, as nuclear weapons require a higher
enrichment level than nuclear fuel (less than 5% for power reactors). Enrichment is
the process of increasing the ratio of 235U to that of the 238U isotope. 235U has a
higher spontaneous fission rate than 238U, hence the need to enrich uranium. As such,
the number and capacity of enrichment facilities are vital to nuclear proliferation.
The capacity of an enrichment facility is measured in Separative Work Unit
(SWU). The number of SWUs is the quantity directly related to the resources re-
quired to enrich material to a desired level. The main resource required to enrich
material is electrical energy for isotope separation. Thus, SWUs are directly propor-
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tional to the energy consumed to enrich material.
This study accounts for all types of enrichment technologies used in pilot, labo-
ratory or commercial scale plants. However, this study will focus on two of the most
common enrichment technologies in gaseous diffusion and centrifuge technology.
Gaseous diffusion relies on the difference in molecular effusion rates of 235UF6
and 238UF6 through a thin barrier containing millions of pores. As a result, when
the UF6 molecules are kept at the same temperature, a kinetic energy comparison
shows that 235UF6 molecules are faster than
238UF6 molecules. Thus, the separation
of molecules is a result of the relative frequency with which molecules pass through
a small hole, leaving material slightly enriched in 235UF6. It is important to note
that these plants consume about 2,300 - 3,000 kW-hr per SWU produced. Some
operational concerns for gaseous diffusion plants are criticality issues, UF6 leaks,
and plugging of the diffusion barriers by solids [22].
Worldwide, roughly about 80% of enrichment is done using centrifuge technology.
Centrifuges are more common due to a variety of factors that include: feasibility, an
ease to build, and simple operation techniques. Centrifuge technology relies around
the use of a rotating drum or cylinder, where the centrifugal force compresses heavier
238UF6 gas molecules to the outer cylinder.
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Figure 2.2: Counter-current Centrifuge Technology. Reprinted with permission from
[23]
An example of a counter-current gas centrifuge can be seen in Figure 2.2. The
UF6 gas rotating inside the cylinder is subject to acceleration much greater than
gravity. As a result, pressure at the outer radius is much greater than pressure at
the center, causing a higher relative abundance of the heavier isotope to be pushed
around the outer radius.
Some other advanced technologies include: AVLIS, Molecular Laser Isotope Sep-
aration (MLIS), and Electromagnetic Isotope Separation (EMIS).
2.1.2 Reprocessing
Additionally, it is important to study used nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities
because of the non-proliferation concerns associated with the plutonium products.
Each one of the reprocessing methods has its own proliferation concern. The following
three reprocessing methods are quite common, Plutonium Uranium Redox Extrac-
tion (PUREX), Uranium Extraction (UREX), and Thorium Extraction (THOREX).
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Figure 2.3: PUREX Process Reprinted with permission from [24]
First let us examine the PUREX process. As seen in Figure 2.3, this process pro-
duces two separate streams of material (U and Pu). Organizations like the IAEA use
in-depth study of these reprocessing methods to appropriately implement safeguards,
attempting to avoid weapons proliferation or diversion of material.
Initially, the used fuel is prepared for dissolution by separating the fuel matrix
from the cladding. After which, the fuel is dissolved into an aqueous solution (fuel
dissolution). The next step is to prepare dissolved feeds by adjusting valence and
acidity for maximum separation. The next step is to remove decontaminants such as
Fission Products (FP) and Transuranics (TRU). The plutonium is separated from
the uranium, thus developing two separate process streams. Following this, both the
U and Pu are purified in their respective streams. Pu production in this process
makes it a proliferation concern. Potential contamination is the only setback the
Pu stream faces. Otherwise, the Pu produced from the stream is weapons usable,
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specifically when the used fuel is discharged at a very low burn-up.
The UREX process recovers 99.9% of Uranium and 95% Technetium from the
spent fuel. Both of these materials are recored in separate product streams. The
UREX process uses similar tools to the PUREX process, but doesn’t recover pure
plutonium. This difference occurs through a modification in the front end of the
process.
The THOREX process can produce either Pu or U depending on the core con-
figuration used. The THOREX process is extremely similar to the PUREX process;
two product streams (Pu & U vs. Th & U). Details of the THOREX process is
shown in Figure 2.4 The general thorium fuel cycle requires that fast reactors use a
seed-blanket configuration, as seen in Figure 2.5.
Figure 2.4: THOREX Process Reprinted with permission from [25]
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Figure 2.5: Seed-Blanket Core Reprinted with permission from [26]
Based on the seed-blanket configuration, the reactor can produce U, Pu or Th.
The traditional fast reactor configuration can be seen in Table 2.1. When the blanket
region comprises of a mixed oxide fuel containing ThO2 and UO2 (Scenario #3 in
Table 2.1), regardless of the seed material the fuel will transmute into the follow-
ing 233U , 235U and 239Pu. The separation of 239Pu from the uranium is a rather
straightforward process, however proliferators will run into issues when attempting
to separate 233U and 235U as this requires isotope separation and not element sepa-
ration. The preferential scenario is to use a blanket region that comprises of 233UO2
and ThO2 (India’s Goal in Table 2.1). In this case, the fuel will transmute and form
an abundance of 233U .
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Table 2.1: Fast Reactor Core Configurations
Fuel
Scenario Seed Blanket Product
Traditional
Fast Reactor
UO2 Depleted UO2 UO2 + Pu
Scenario #2 UO2 ThO2 ThO2 +
233U
Scenario #3 233UO2 or
235UO2 or PuO2 Depleted UO2 + ThO2
233U + 235U + Pu
India’s Goal 233UO2 ThO2 Th +
233U
As discussed earlier, the listed reprocessing and enrichment methods can produce
significant amounts of SNM, to be used in weapons. Hence, the objective of estimat-
ing the number of ENR facilities a state can possess based on indicators selected in
this study is very important. In the following two chapters the methodology and the
tool for estimation are described.
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3. BAYESIAN NETWORK ANALYSIS
Bayesian networks were used as the predictive model for this investigation. An
overview of Bayesian methodologies should provide insight on how objectives were
met. Bayesian networks are graphical models that represent conditional dependence
relationships between a set of random variables such that information about the
state of one random variable can be used to infer additional information about other
variables. Bayesian networks can be constructed from data and expert judgment,
allowing for comparison and cross-checking of independent results.
Previous work on nuclear weapons proliferation and their indicators have used
different methodologies. For instance, Singh and Way studied correlates of nu-
clear weapons proliferation with Event History Models and Multinomial Lo-
gistic Regressions [4]. Jo and Gartzke studied the effect of determinants on nu-
clear weapons programs and possession through Probit Regression Analysis [17].
Lastly, Kroenig employs Rare Events Logistic Regression to study the corre-
lates of sensitive nuclear assistance [27]. Previous work highlights the use of various
regression analysis types to study nuclear weapons proliferation.
However, work done by Freeman [10] and Mella [5] indicate the potential to use
Bayesian Networks as an analysis tool. Freeman identifies the need for decision
making tools and the ability for models to capture the dynamic nature of prolifer-
ation [10]. Both Freeman and Mella studied proliferation pathways, for non-state
actors and state actors. Additional work done by Elmore [28] highlights the ability
to scientifically define physical realities, such as steps required to acquire SNM, in
Bayesian networks. Evolving Bayesian networks allow continuous updates on new
applicable proliferation technologies [28]. The overall goal is to measure the num-
ber of ENR facilities. The varying dynamic factors that affect ENR development
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prompted the use of Bayesian Networks as an analysis tool.
3.1 Bayes Theorem
To understand Bayes’ theorem, take the following two independent events, H and
E. There is an initial probability for event H, P(H), based on a prior belief about H.
Using P(E) the revised probability of H is represented as P(H|E). Based on this a
conditional probability, P(H|E) can be represented as:
P (H|E) = P (H ∩ E)
P (E)
(3.1)
The previous equation determines the probability of H occurring given E occurred.
In this case, P (H∩E) represents the probability of both events occurring. Similarly,
P (E|H) = P (E ∩H)
P (H)
(3.2)
The probability of the intersection of these events are identical. Additionally, the
probability of E is equal to probability of the intersection of H and E plus the proba-
bility of the complement of H (Hc) and E. [5]. The probability of the complement of
H (Hc) is 1−P (H). With some algebraic rearrangement, the generic Bayes’ theorem
becomes:
P (H|E) = P (E|H)P (H)
P (E|H)P (H) + P (E|Hc)P (Hc) (3.3)
The above identity theorem establishes the basis of Bayesian networks.
3.2 Bayesian Network(s)
Bayesian networks are probabilistic directed acyclic graphs that rely on Bayes
theorem to represent probabilistic relationships. All of the edges in a graph are
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directed, and there are no cycles [29]. Bayesian networks represent joint probability
models among given variables [30].
A C
B
Figure 3.1: Bayesian Network
Figure 3.1 represents a Bayesian network with the following set of Edges: E =
(B,A), (B,C). It is important to recognize that there are no undirected edges and
no cycles. A cycle is where in a graph after leaving one vertex and following the
direction of the edges, there is a way to cycle back to the initial vertex. The joint
probability distribution for this network (Figure 3.1) is as follows:
P (A,B,C) = P (A|B) ∗ P (B) ∗ P (C|B). (3.4)
Since A and C are conditionally independent, results in P (A|B,C) = P (A|B) and
P (C|A,B) = P (C|B). This allows for the simplification of the joint probability
distribution. P (A,B,C) represents the joint probability distribution for all nodes
in the network (Figure 3.1). Equation 3.4 can be simplified using Bayes’ theorem,
resulting in:
P (A,B,C) = P (A|B) ∗ P (B) ∗ P (C|B) (3.5)
=
P (B|A) ∗ P (A)
P (B)
∗ P (B) ∗ P (C|B) (3.6)
= P (A) ∗ P (B|A) ∗ P (C|B) (3.7)
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It is important to note that edges in Bayesian networks are connections. As a
result, it must be recognized that a joint probability distribution represented by one
set of edges can equally be represented by another set of edges. Therefore equation
3.7 results in the following Bayesian network.
A C
B
Figure 3.2: Bayesian Network with Reverse Link
Therefore, it can be seen that the joint probability distribution for Figure 3.1 and
Figure 3.2 are identical [31]. From this basic example, a general bayesian network
with nodes X = X1,...,Xn, has the following the joint probability distribution:
P (X) =
n∏
i=1
P (Xi|parents(Xi)) (3.8)
Characteristics of such networks include:
• A set of variables identifying important factors,
• Direct dependencies between variables are represented by directed edges (links)
between the corresponding nodes,
• Each variable has a finite set of mutually exclusive states, and
• Each variable A with parents B1, ...., Bn, will have an corresponding conditional
probability table. [32]
One of the largest challenges when developing probabilistic models is the high
number of combination of results (joint distributions). Therefore, Bayesian networks
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were introduced to avoid further problems. The conditional dependency of one node
to another saves computational time. Instead of storing all possible configurations,
Bayesian networks only require that all possible combinations of states between re-
lated parent and child nodes to be stored [32].
3.3 Bayesian Learning Methods
Once models are developed, a dataset must be identified as the training dataset.
This dataset is trained on the model, and allows the model to develop predictive re-
lationships. After which, a testing dataset can be used to test predictions. However,
in some cases the training dataset doesn’t encapsulate all variables. In such cir-
cumstances, Netica provides two different learning methods, to be used for ”hidden”
variables. ”Hidden” variables are defined as those for which there are no observa-
tions, but are believed to be vital to the developed model. The following two methods
are provided; (i) Expectation - Maximization (EM) and (ii) Gradient Descent (GD).
There are four different types of learning problems that are usually faced when
using Bayesian networks. The learning problems are a result of the combination of
possibilities between the network structure and the status of the data. A network
that has a complete dataset and a known structure only requires statistical parame-
ter estimation. A network with an unknown structure and complete dataset requires
discrete optimization over structures. If the network has a known structure and
an incomplete dataset, it requires parametric optimization (EM, GD methods). Fi-
nally, a network with an unknown structure and incomplete data requires combined
algorithms such as structural EM and mixture models. [33]
It is important to note that it is common practice to have unique training and
testing datasets. However, the dearth of data for nuclear weapons programs forces
this study to use the same training and testing datasets. Chapter 6 will be dedicated
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to identifying the accuracy of results.
3.3.1 Expectation - Maximization
The EM algorithm is deterministic and can be applied to problems that can be
considered incomplete data problems. It is an iterative process that utilizes several
predictive distributions.
The contents of this paragraph are paraphrased from Approximation Methods
for Efficient Learning of Bayesian Networks by Riggselsen [34]. Refer to Riggselsen
for additional details. The EM algorithm consists of two specifics steps, E-step
and the M-step. The E-step predicts missing values given the current best estimate.
Following that, the M-step calculates the parameter estimate using the statistics form
of the E-step and now inputs that as the new best estimate. This process is repeated
to produce a sequence of statistical values. Eventually, this iterative process will
converge towards the true parameter. The convergence time is dependent upon the
number of missing data variables. EM methods are used extensively for parameter
learning and as such would be very useful to develop further models for this study.
3.3.2 Gradient Descent
Gradient Descent is an algorithm used to train a model with the given observa-
tion data. GD methods are more often used to tune a Bayesian network such that
certain nodes represent the anticipated probability. The GD method relies on back
propagation, where local calculations are used to calculate the gradient of error as a
function of the identified parameters (variables). This method is an iterative method
that converges when the gradient is as close to 0 as possible.
It is important to note that gradient descent methods are most commonly used
with neural networks. However, Ramachandran and Mooney devised a method to
incorporate back-propagation methods into Bayesian networks [35]. The proposed
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learning technique suggested to first learn conditional probabilities on Bayesian net-
works. After which, the Bayesian network should be mapped to a multi-layered
neural network. This step is required as the GD method was developed to be used
in neural networks. Once the network is mapped to a neural network, that network
must be trained with the GD method. After this, the trained neural network can be
transformed into a Bayesian network. Luckily, a lot of Bayesian network software is
designed to provide this method intrinsically. [35]
The provided gradient descent option via Netica software, utilizes a “conjugate
gradient descent” method to maximize the probability of the data by adjusting the
conditional probability tables. This algorithm will generally converge faster than
EM learning, this however should not be of concern for this study. [36]
24
4. DATA AND MODEL DEVELOPMENT
4.1 Dataset
The forthcoming paper A Spatial Model of Nuclear Technology Diffusion by
Fuhrmann and Tkach captures global patterns of nuclear diffusion from 1950 to
2000, which proves to be a useful dataset for this study. [37] Geo-spatial modeling
aims to capture the concept of geo-spatial contagion, the inter-dependence between
countries. Previous studies have recognized that international diffusion influences the
spread of nuclear technology. The Fuhrmann & Tkach study is not focusing on spa-
tial contagion occurring with explicit militarization of a nuclear program. Instead, it
studies spatial contagion in relation to a perceived nuclear threat. A perceived nu-
clear threat can be defined in a multitude of ways. A common example is obtaining
peaceful dual-use technology, thus enabling states to build nuclear weapons in the
event of a crisis, better known as nuclear hedging.
The accompanying dataset to the Fuhrmann and Tkach paper was chosen for this
study as it captured potential indicators of weapons proliferation. These indicators
include both motivations and technical capabilities. The dependent variable (Ad-
vanced Nuclear Plants) was taken from the Nuclear Latency (NL) dataset. In this
case, Advanced Nuclear Plants measures the number of operating ENR facilities a
state has in a given year. The NL dataset has information on all ENR facilities in
the world from 1939 to 2010.
Table 4.1 summarizes the dataset. It lists countries, the number of years a coun-
try was considered, and the number of ENR facilities per state. Each country is
represented in the dataset based on the existence of an operational research reactor.
This data shows that over 55% of countries considered have not developed ENR
facilities.
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Table 4.1: Summary of Furhmann & Tkach Dataset
State Frequency Number of Ad-
vanced Nuclear
Facilities
State Frequency Number of Ad-
vanced Nuclear
Facilities
Algeria 9 1 Argentina 40 4
Australia 28 2 Austria 38 0
Belarus 7 0 Belgium 42 1
Brazil 41 7 Bulgaria 37 0
Canada 49 3 Chile 24 0
China 40 13 Colombia 33 0
Czechoslovakia 31 1 Democratic Republic of
Korea
33 3
Denmark 41 0 Egypt 37 3
Finland 36 0 France 50 19
Georgia 7 0 German Democratic Re-
public
29 0
German Federal Republic 29 0 Germany 8 6
Ghana 33 0 Greece 39 0
Hungary 39 0 India 42 11
Iran 38 10 Iraq 31 9
Israel 39 4 Italy 39 4
Jamaica 14 0 Japan 41 9
Korea, Republic of 39 0 Latvia 7 0
Libya 17 3 Lithuania 7 0
Mexico 30 0 Netherlands 43 5
Norway 47 1 Pakistan 37 8
Peru 20 0 Poland 40 0
Portugal 39 0 Romania 41 1
Russia 54 31 South Africa 34 5
Spain 40 4 Sweden 44 1
Switzerland 43 0 Taiwan 37 3
Ukraine 7 0 United Kingdom 51 19
Uruguay 20 0 USA 54 46
Venezuela 38 0 Yugoslavia 19 4
26
4.2 Procedures
Based on the literature review, the following factors were considered as pertinent
to developing ENR facilities [37]:
1. Technical Capability
(a) GDP per Capita
(b) Nuclear Weapons Arsenal (Binary)
(c) Nuclear Electricity Production
2. Motivation
(a) Super Power Alliance (Binary)
(b) Number of Disputes
(c) Number of ENR Facilities by Rival States
3. Number of ENR Facilities by Trading Partners
After identifying these factors, it is vital to develop two different models. The
first model (basic model) determines the relevancy of the identified factors, while the
second model (tiered model) ensures that a structured approach is used to develop
relationships between certain factors.
The predictive networks(s) developed were simulated through Bayesian networks.
These Bayesian networks were developed using Netica. After eight nodes are devel-
oped, for the basic model, they are linked together with the use of edges. The result
is seen in Figure 4.5, notice that the states of each node have equivalent probabilities.
At this stage, it is necessary to train (provide) the model with data. Model training
enables the model to transform into a predictive model. It must also be noted that
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the historical data was adjusted to fit the discrete constraints of each node, more
information can be found in Section 4.4.1 and Table(s) A.1 to A.4. After the model
is trained with historical data, the resultant model is seen in Figure 4.1.
The tiered model requires a similar approach, where ten nodes are developed and
linked together with the use of edges. However, with the tiered model there are
no available data for two nodes (Tech Capability and Motivation). The identified
learning methods in Section 3.3 were used in addition to the data, thus enabling the
model with predictive capabilities.
Models were ready for use after being developed and trained with relevant datasets.
Netica offers a Java API, which can be used to run large case files. In this situation, a
case file would represent the dataset to be tested on the developed model. Case files
must contain data for nodes in the network, and represent node values as discretized
in the network. One row in a case file represents a specific year for a state, this
dataset has 2241 rows of data. Using the API and R, the Netica model was modified
for each row of data. Once the model is modified, each node is set to a specific state
specified by the data. The dependent nodes probability vector changes as the inputs
to the models change.
The probability vector represents the probability of having a certain number of
ENR facilities. Referencing Table A.3, weighted means are found for each state. The
probability vector and weighted means are multiplied together, resulting in a vector
of values. The summation of these vector values are rounded resulting in the overall
estimate of the number of ENR facilities a state has in that year.
Plots were developed that compare the historical data versus the predictive model
results on a time series x-axis. These plots are developed for each state, to better
visualize the results of the simulations from the Bayesian networks.
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4.3 Indicators
As previously identified, the dependent variable is the number of ENR facilities
a state holds. Exactly ten variables were identified, two of which are classifying
variables, which will be used in a more complex model. The independent variables
account for Nuclear Electricity production, GDP Per Capita, Disputes, Superpower
Alliance and Nuclear Arsenal. Additionally, the average number of ENR plants
possessed by a states rivals and its nuclear trading partners are two variables that
were used from Fuhrmann and Tkachs work that identify inter-dependence between
countries. The classifying variables are technical capabilities and motivations.
After identifying variables, the following topics were studied: key concepts in-
fluencing the phenomena of interest (variables) and the relationship amongst these
variables. This ensures that the variables are related and have an impact on mea-
suring the overall dependent variable.
4.4 Model Development
Bayesian networks were used as the predictive model for this study. Three dif-
ferent models were developed. The first model (basic model) aims to validate that
the independent variables can appropriately measure the number of ENR facilities a
state would have.
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Figure 4.1: Basic Model (Bayesian Network)
The basic model assumes that all predictor variables are conditionally indepen-
dent from one another. Note how there are no edges between the predictor variables
and the classifying variables, which are omitted as it detracts from assessing variable
independence.
After assessing conditional independence, a more advanced model was developed
(hereafter known as the tiered model). This model assumes conditional dependence
of certain independent variables on the classifying variables: Technical Capability
and Motivations. This model adds complexity by acknowledging the decisions and
factors that go into constructing ENR facilities. As discussed before, Nuclear Oppor-
tunity and Nuclear Willingness influence weapons proliferation decisions [4]; these
two categories roughly translate to the classifying nodes in the tiered model. Various
literature has confirmed the complexities of nuclear weapons proliferation, hence the
development of a tiered model. The variables GDP Per Capita, Nuclear Electricity
Production, Nuclear Arsenal, and ENR Facilities-Trading Partners influence a states
technical capability, while ENR Facilities Rival, Disputes, and Superpower Alliance
influence a states motivation.
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Figure 4.2: Tiered Model (Bayesian Network)
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As seen in Figure 4.1, the network contains eight nodes each of which has a
number of states (ranging from two states to five states). When developing such
a network, two key steps are required: node discretization and network training.
Network training provides initial conditional probability tables (CPT) which are
used to allow the model to estimate or predict the dependent variable. This initial
CPT is developed through the distribution of data for each node. The data provided
must have column names that match the node names in the network. For further
details on Bayesian network, please see Section 3.
4.4.1 State Development
In a Bayesian network, each variable has a discrete set of possible states. Regard-
less of the type of variable (continuous or numeric) used in a Bayesian network, it is
necessary to define a mapping from the natural variable domain to a set of chosen
discrete states (e.g. High/Medium/Low). In order to choose appropriate states, the
data for each variable was plotted as a histogram. Each histogram used a different
discrimination techniques. The even spacing technique developed five even breaks in
the data, forcing there to be exactly five states in all of the nodes except for the Nu-
clear Arsenal and Superpower Alliance node. The fixed spacing technique developed
breaks based on user choice. We will later realize that user choice is too arbitrary.
The quantile method develops quantiles using the data provided [38].
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Figure 4.3: State Discrimination for the GDP Cap (LN)
In the Figure 4.3, the aforementioned histograms are plotted for the logged values
of the GDP per capita variable in the dataset. From these plots, it is clear that none
of these breaks are intuitive. After reviewing similar histograms for all independent
variables, it was concluded that state discretization would occur based on natural
breaks in the data. Natural breaks in the data were defined based on the expected
occurrences. For instance, for data to be categorized as high it should not appear
to often in the data. Histograms were used to identify the location of these natural
breaks. A figure of final discretization for a few variables can be seen in Table A.1.
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Figure 4.4: Final State Discrimination
4.4.2 Model Training
A model is only partially developed after nodes and the number of states for each
are identified, commonly known as an untrained model (Figure 4.5). This model cap-
tures an equivalent probability between states for each node, which is extremely rare.
Model training can use a variety of different algorithms, the most common algorithms
include expectation-maximization, gradient descent, and generalized probability dis-
tribution. Further details for the algorithms can be found in section 3.
Figure 4.5: Untrained Basic Model
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Depending on the model structure, it may or may not be required that additional
CPTs are developed for missing data. The basic model did not require additional
CPTs, instead marginal probabilities were developed by training the dataset on the
network. In the case of the tiered model, there is no data for the classifying nodes.
This can be mitigated through the use of specific training methods (EM). Another
option would be to conduct an expert elicitation and aggregate the results. Such a
process will require the development of a CPT.
In the tiered model, technical capability depends on GDP per Capita, Nuclear
Electricity production, Nuclear arsenal and the number of ENR facilities held by
Trading Partners. This classifying node is a bit more complex, as no single parent
node overwhelms the other (See Table A.5). For the development of this CPT, GDP
per Capita and the number of ENR facilities held by Trading Partners were consid-
ered to be more influential than other nodes. As their relative strength increased,
so did a states technical capability. Table A.5 affirms that the two overwhelming
parent nodes are GDP per Capita and the number of ENR facilities held by Trading
Partners. Additionally, if a state were to also possess a nuclear weapons arsenal,
then their technical capability probability is representative of a higher technical ca-
pability. The technical capability probability for a state with a weapons arsenal is
not skewed to represent a low technical capability, but instead is dependent on the
other parent nodes [38]
As a result of the multiple training methods and training through expert elicita-
tion, there are three different tiered models. A correlation statistic will be calculated
to determine the most accurate method for this study.
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5. SIMULATIONS
5.1 Countries Chosen
The following historical examples were chosen to validate the developed networks:
Brazil, India, South Africa, and Sweden. Each of these countries were chosen to
highlight different aspects of nuclear weapons proliferation. These case studies were
examined to ensure historical validation.
5.1.1 South Africa
South Africa was always a country of importance to the United States and United
Kingdom as a source of uranium ore. In 1940, the South African Atomic Energy
Board was formed. In the 1950’s more distinct plans were made for nuclear science
research in South Africa ranging from the development of a research reactor to al-
lowing South African scientists to visit U.S Atomic Energy Commission facilities [39]
[40]. The first South African research reactor (Safari I) went operational in 1965.
Safari I is still in operation, but as of 2005 was converted from HEU fuel to LEU
fuel [41].
Figure 5.1: South African ENR Facilities
As per Fuhrmann and Tkach, it was found that South Africa has five different
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ENR facilities. The Fuhrmann and Tkach study considers South Africa in the dataset
after 1965, as per the definition of when the first research reactor is operational. The
following five ENR facilities were identified:
1. Valindaba (Laser)
2. Valindaba Y-Plant
3. Valindaba Z-Plant
4. Valindaba Z-Plant at Laboratory Enrichment Facility
5. Hot Cell Complex, Pelindaba Nuclear Research Center.
Note that the Valindaba Z-Plant includes two facilities a semi-commercial en-
richment plant, and a laboratory enrichment plant. The laboratory facility was
operational between 1967-1988, while the commercial facility was operation from
1986-1995. Both facilities used aerodynamic isotope separation for enrichment, the
lab scale facility was developed initially to determine feasibility. Location of all ENR
plants can be seen in Figure 5.1. For further information on ENR facilities, please
refer to Fuhrmann and Tkach[37].
South Africa is the only example of a state voluntarily dismantling a nuclear
weapons program. It is essential for this case to be tested as it would determine
whether the nuclear arsenal variable is necessary and functional in the developed
predictive models.
5.1.2 Brazil
Brazil is another interesting case, as it sought nuclear capabilities to rival Ar-
gentina and to gain international prestige. Brazil’s nuclear program began in a very
similar fashion to the South African’s, as they signed a mining agreement with the
United States in 1945. After which, subsequent agreements were signed to transfer
nuclear technology to Brazil. The United State’s “Atoms for Peace” program paved
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the way for Brazil to obtain its first research reactor (IEA-R1), in 1957 [42]. In 1975,
the Brazilian-German deal was signed, ensuring Brazil’s purchase of eight nuclear
power reactors, and pilot-scale technology (plutonium and uranium reprocessing)
from West Germany. This deal was estimated to be between $10-$15 million dollars
[43]. This deal signified Brazil’s interest in developing latent capability.
The pilot-scale facility purchased from West Germany was very similar to the
Trombay facility in India. It’s irradiated fuel throughput, based on fuel burn-up,
could have produced enough plutonium for up-to half a dozen nuclear weapons a
year. The purchased enrichment facility had the capability to produce HEU for
several nuclear weapons per year [44]. Additionally, Brazil’s refusal to sign the NPT
signaled that the German deal facilitated Brazil’s nuclear weapons development.
This is further confirmed when Meyer shows that the Brazil’s nuclear propensity
jumps from 0.1 in 1974 to 0.2 in 1975, as per the definition of nuclear propensity this
is seen as a substantial increase [2].
Figure 5.2: Brazilian ENR Facilities
Fuhrmann and Tkach identified seven different ENR facilities in Brazil. Brazil
was considered in the dataset after 1957, when the first research reactor became
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operational. These seven facilities were identified:
1. Aerospace Technical Center (Institute of Advanced Studies)
2. BRF Enrichment - Aramar Demonstration Center
3. BRN Enrichment (Aramar Isotopic Enrichment Lab)
4. INB Resende - Enrichment Facility
5. INB Resende - Enrichment Facility
6. IPEN - Reprocessing
7. Pilot Enrichment Plant (INB Resende)
Note that once again, a single location (INB Resende) is counted multiple times.
In this case, the three different facilities are a commercial centrifuge plant, an aero-
dynamic isotope separation pilot plant (1979-1989), and an aerodynamic isotope
separation pilot plant (1990-1994).
The Brazilian case study will lend insight to the importance that rivals play in
proliferation decisions. It will also study the importance of a state’s desire to be
considered an international power or as a “regional superpower”.
5.1.3 India
India obtained nuclear weapons as means of deterrence against China and to
protect against their rival Pakistan. Jawarhlal Nehru, the first prime minister of India
would take it upon himself to found the non-aligned movement and advocate nuclear
disarmament. However, Nehru refused to rule out the nuclear option for India. In
1948, India would pass the Atomic Energy Act. Following this, in 1955 India would
construct the Apsara research reactor with British assistance. In 1956, Canada
would agree to supply India with a research reactor (named CIRUS) with higher
power output (40 MW). The Canadian reactor was used to produce weapons-grade
plutonium, signaling Indian interest in a nuclear weapons program. Subsequently, in
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May of 1974 India would successfully test its first nuclear bomb, famously known as
the Smiling Buddha.
Figure 5.3: Indian ENR Facilities
Fuhrmann and Tkach identified eleven different ENR facilities in India. India
was considered in the dataset after 1955, when the first research reactor became
operation. The following facilities were identified:
1. BARC, Trombay (Pilot)
2. BARC, Trombay (Commercial)
3. BARC, Laser Enrichment Plant
4. BARC, Trombay (Reprocessing)
5. BARC, PREFRE (Reprocessing)
6. CAT, Laser Enrichment Plant
7. FRFRP (Reprocessing)
8. KARP, Reprocessing
9. KARP, Laboratory
10. Lead Facility, (Reprocessing)
11. Materials Plant, (Enrichment)
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As identified before, certain locations have multiple facilities. The Indian nu-
clear complex was structured in such a manner that a certain location would posses
multiple fuel cycle capabilities (i.e fuel fabrication, enrichment, reprocessing, and
etc).
The Indian case required two proliferation decisions in 1965 and 1972. The former
was reversed in 1966 thus requiring a second decision. Additionally, both prolifer-
ation decisions highlight the convergence of motivation and a pre-existing technical
capability. It also recognizes that regardless of technical capability, when motiva-
tions change it could lead to decision reversals [2]. There are multiple driving factors
towards the heightened development of the Indian nuclear weapons program. The
primary factor for Indian proliferation was the Chinese nuclear weapon test in 1964.
Border conflicts between the two nations, preempted India to develop a nuclear de-
terrent. At the time, development of nuclear weapons gave India an upper-hand
against Pakistan. It is important to recognize that Pakistan received aid from the
Chinese to further develop their nuclear weapons program. Besides countering rivals,
India sought nuclear weapons to be recognized as a “regional superpower” in Asia.
5.1.4 Sweden
Sweden explored nuclear weapons immediately following World War II, to posses
a form of deterrence against a looming Soviet Union and to maintain political non-
alignment. In its infancy, the Swedish program was a clandestine program within
the Swedish National Defence Research Institute (FOA).
The Swedish program identified local sources of uranium, which were later con-
firmed as one of the richest in the western world by both the UK and USA. The
Swede’s focused on nuclear energy production, with plutonium production as a
byproduct of the system. In 1954, the Swedish nuclear weapons development was
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discussed openly, as a result of the first reactor (R-1) going operational.
Between 1959 to 1962, Sweden and its armed forces regime did not feel compelled
to acquire nuclear weapons. This occurred due to multiple reasons, Sigvard Eklund
becoming the Secretary General of the IAEA, Foreign Minister Unden continuously
promoted international disarmament, and multiple reports by the FOA had shown
the increased costs of a nuclear weapons program developed internally. Instead,
cooperating with the USA would significantly decrease the cost, but would place
restrictions such as foreign inspections. Eventually in 1968, Sweden would sign the
NPT and close the opportunity for a nuclear option [45].
Figure 5.4: Swedish ENR Facilities
Fuhrmann and Tkach identified a lone ENR facility in Sweden.
1. Pilot Plutonium Reprocessing Plant.
This facility was a pilot spent fuel reprocessing plant. This pilot plant began con-
struction in 1946. It was estimated to be operation between 1946 to 1968. Multiple
different sources cite varying dates for when Sweden acquired nuclear latency. How-
ever, all sources cite the development of R-1 and the enrichment plant as indicators
of developing nuclear latency.
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5.2 Model Results
In the following section, we will examine the different models developed with re-
spect to the countries discussed above. The countries selected had key characteristics
relating to geo-spatial contagion.
When provided with inputs for a given state in a year, all the developed models
“backcast” in time the number of ENR facilities a given state would be expected
to have. The result is a probability vector, which corresponds to the estimated
number of ENR facilities a state should have in a particular year, based on the
inputs provided. This probability vector is transformed into a single numeric value,
by a weighted sums approach for each vector value.
5.2.1 Basic Model
The basic model (as seen in Figure 4.1), represents the simplest model, where
all predictor variables are independent of one another. In the following results, it is
important to identify trends, instead of the accuracy of results. Identifying trends
allows for cross-checking of various nodes, it is easily identified when studying binary
nodes such as: nuclear arsenal and superpower alliance.
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Figure 5.5: Geo-spatial results for RSA (Basic)
Results obtained from the basic model for South Africa highlight the extreme
change in the proliferation status of a state. As discussed earlier, South Africa vol-
untarily dismantled their nuclear weapons program in 1989. In 1991, South Africa
would sign the NPT. The predictive model estimates drop drastically from 12 fa-
cilities to 1, between 1990 and 1991. In comparison, there is a similar drop from 4
facilities to 1, in the Fuhrmann and Tkach dataset, between 1988 to 1995. Therefore,
the results above affirm that the model accurately accounts for whether a state has
a nuclear arsenal in a given year or not.
It even goes to show that the nuclear arsenal node is a large driving factor for
estimations. Realistically speaking, when a state makes a decision to voluntary
dismantle, the dismantlement process takes a few years and as a result the decom-
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missioning of other nuclear facilities cane take anywhere from two to ten years. The
results show that the model does not have the capability to capture the entire dis-
mantlement process, which should be considered for future work.
Figure 5.6: Geo-spatial results for Brazil (Basic)
The Brazilian-German deal signed in 1975, signals an interest in nuclear weapons.
This interest in nuclear weapons should inherently affect GDP per capita and nuclear
electricity production. It can be seen in both datasets, following 1975 the number of
ENR facilities increase. there seems to be other factors that cause for a delay and
underestimation in the results provided by the basic model. These factors will be
addressed when studying the tiered model.
Additionally, the Brazilian case also highlights a rivalry between Brazil and Ar-
gentina. However, this is unlike the Indian case as the rivalry does not result in
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confrontation. Argentina furthered its nuclear research in 1983, at which time both
datasets show that Brazilian efforts increased through the development of ENR fa-
cilities. In 1991, both Argentina and Brazil renounced their nuclear rivalry, at which
point it can be seen that the number of ENR facilities decreases.
The Brazilian case study affirms that the basic model has the capability to man-
age complex situations, where multiple factors play into a state’s nuclear weapons
program. In this specific case, technical capability factors, a rivalry, and the need to
be a regional superpower are all highlighted in the estimations provided.
Figure 5.7: Geo-spatial results for India (Basic)
It is important to note that India made two proliferation decisions, one in 1965
and another in 1972. The reversal of the first decision in 1966 has a delayed effect
on the estimation results from 1966 to 1975. Following which, India went into the
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“the Emergency” phase from 1975 to 1977. It is also important to note, that even
though the number of ENR facilities dropped in both the predictive model as well
as the Fuhrmann and Tkach dataset, India conducted its first nuclear test (Smiling
Buddha) in 1974. The Indian case is important to study as it encapsulates the effect
of rivals. China successfully tested its first nuclear weapon in 1964, leading to the
second proliferation decision by India. In fact, the predictive model captures this
and suggests that the number of ENR facilities should increase. In 1972, Pakistan
initialized its weapons program. After which, it can be seen that both the predictive
model and the Fuhrman and Tkach dataset begin trending upwards. Therefore, the
Indian estimation results identify trends based on rivals and disputes both of which
are represented as nodes in the basic model. However, the current model does not
have a node with the capability of capturing proliferation decisions.
Figure 5.8: Geo-spatial results for Sweden (Basic)
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Sweden is a unique case for proliferation in the European region. Sweden had
no interest in becoming a regional superpower, instead the proliferation option was
considered as a means of deterrence against the Soviet Union and other potential
disputes. It is also important to note, that Sweden’s development of nuclear facil-
ities greatly impacted their economy as entities were partially owned by the state.
Therefore an interest in nuclear weapons and developing capabilities in the early to
mid 60’s dictated the increase of the results from the predictive model. This interest
directly correlates to higher economic capacities, a driving factor in the basic model.
There is no particular method to capture the motivation behind proliferation
decisions. However, the factors represented in the basic model (as seen in Figure 4.1)
can potentially be associated with a state’s motivation to proliferate. One factor in
the basic model captures the signing of the NPT. The expected number of Swedish
ENR facilities drops around 1968, Sweden officially agrees to the NPT. In most cases,
the signing of the NPT could be linked with acquiring a superpower alliance.
After examination of the results of all states represented in the data, the trends
in the basic model estimations, be it increasing or decreasing, are consistent with
trends found in the dataset provided by Fuhrmann and Tkach. After ensuring that
the model consistently depicted trends, the next step is to develop a model that has
the capability to match trends consistently but also make more accurate estimates.
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5.2.2 Tiered Model: EM Learning Method
In order to develop accuracy for the estimates while retaining trends, it was
necessary to introduce a hierarchy system. This hierarchy system developed can be
seen in Figure 4.2. This new model, hereafter known as the tiered model, grouped
together the independent predictors into two overarching categories: motivations and
technical capability. After extensive literature review, and examining results from the
basic model it seems evident that proliferation decisions are based on the convergence
of motivation and technical capability. There are exceptions however, when a state’s
motivation is strong enough, it can dictate the development of technical capability
further leading to the development of a nuclear weapons program.
With the introduction of two new variables, technical capability and motivation,
it is necessary to provide data to the model. Providing data to the model allows
the bayesian network to become a predictive tool. In this case, there is no data for
these nodes as there is no way to distinctly measure a state’s motivation or technical
capability. Therefore, when data is missing bayesian networks can be equipped
with two different learning methods, Expectation-Maximization and gradient descent
learning. In this section, the model was trained with the EM learning method. Later
on certain statistical methods will be used to analyze and determine which method
is more appropriate.
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Figure 5.9: Geo-spatial results for RSA (Tiered-EM)
From Figure 5.9, the EM method does not change the fact that the model captures
the presence of the nuclear arsenal node.
The EM method does yield slightly different results compared to those shown
with the basic model in Figure 5.1, specifically magnitude and trends. With regards
to trends, the EM method alleviates the random one year discrepancies, notice in
Figure 5.1 that the estimated number of ENR facilities varies slightly from 1985 to
1990. These one year discrepancies are unwanted as they are most likely anomalies.
It must be noted that the network does not produce an estimate in the form of an
exact number. Instead, it produces a probability vector that must be deciphered and
converted to represent a whole number.
At this point, to yield a better discussion on the estimations provided it is impor-
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tant to study the inputs provided, see Figure 5.10. These inputs will provide insight
on what variable drives the model to make certain estimations.
From Figure 5.10, it is immediately obvious that the nuclear arsenal node is a
driving factor. This affirms that ENR facilities are required for a state to maintain
a sustainable nuclear weapons program. Note that between the late 70’s and 1990,
the major driving factors were a combination of the GDP per Capita and nuclear
electricity production. Therefore, in this case it seems that the model places a higher
emphasis on the true technical capabilities than the motivational profile.
However, the actual development of ENR Facilities (shown in blue) follows the
trend displayed by the number of disputes over time. Such a trend is expected as
the South African’s built nuclear weapons to develop deterrence from a potential
emerging Soviet threat. Therefore the motivational profile consisted of the need for
a deterrence (due to disputes), need for regional prestige, and a growing insecurity
of neighboring countries. It is important to note that alongside voluntary disman-
tlement the motivational profile decreased in 1988 as the South African’s signed a
cease-fire with Cuba and Angola. Thus prompting a decrease in the number of ENR
facilities.
Thus for this case, the actual development of ENR facilities was dependent upon
the motivational profile. Whereas the predictive model seems to indicate that the
technical capabilities drive the development of ENR facilities.
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Figure 5.10: Data for South Africa
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Figure 5.11: Geo-spatial results for Brazil (Tiered-EM)
In comparison to Figure 5.6, the EM method results (Figure 5.11) successfully
mitigates the one year discrepancies shown in the basic model. It seems that in this
case the EM algorithm smooths the results, however this could be a result of the
inputs provided.
Figure 5.12 depicts the change in inputs over time. The predictive model seems
to stay pretty stagnant. The predictive model values technical capabilities such as
GDP Per Capita and nuclear electricity production. It believes that the Brazilian
case was strong enough to have two ENR facilites as soon as the first research reactor
went operational in 1957. However, it is possible for a state to be considered in this
study after ENR facilities have been developed. The predictive model recognizes the
erratic nature of the nuclear electricity production and the number of disputes and
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suggests that an average number of facilities (mostly 3) would suffice for Brazilian
needs.
The actual development of ENR facilities was first dependent upon GDP Per
Capita up until 1989. As the GDP Per Capita increased, so did the number of ENR
facilities. This corresponds with the Brazil and German agreement. Additionally,
economies tend to see an boosts following a proliferation decision. After 1989, the
erratic nature of nuclear electricity production and the decreased number of disputes
caused a drop off in the number of ENR facilities held by Brazil. The drop off
in facility count also goes hand in hand with the nuclear cooperation agreement
between Brazil and Argentina in 1991. The result of this agreement was the creation
of the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials
(ABACC).
Thus in this case, the actual number of facilities (F&T model) correspond with
technical capabilities as well as the motivational profile. This example shows the
complexity of a proliferation decision, and how it can be affected by varying factors
over time. The predictive model also represents a combination of technical capabil-
ities and the motivational profile. However, the erratic nature of inputs caused the
estimation to be an average value.
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Figure 5.12: Data for Brazil
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Figure 5.13: Geo-spatial results for India (Tiered-EM)
The basic model (Figure 5.7) captures the two proliferation decisions in 1965 and
1972. However, this is not immediately eminent when studying results from the EM
method, as seen in Figure 5.13.
The predictive model does not capture proliferation decisions, however there is no
variable included in the model to measure decisions. It does however estimate a total
of two ENR facilities from the late 50’s to mid 80’s. This occurs because the technical
capability is relatively low in comparison to the number of disputes during this time
frame. Following the second proliferation decision, India ramped up its technical
capability in order to develop ENR facilities. After, declaring that India was a nuclear
power the predictive model estimates a growth in facilities. This growth corresponds
to the maintenance and growth of the program, but can’t be confirmed without
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explicitly developing a variable to capture this motivation. Such work is out of the
scope of this study. Therefore, the predictive model results delineates three phases
associated with ENR facility development: initial weapons program development
(50’s - 80’s), weapons declaration (88-94), and growth of weapons program (95-2000).
The actual development of ENR facilities corresponds well with disputes, repre-
senting the motivational profile. As per the historical case study provided earlier,
India’s driving factor to proliferate occurred due to its rival neighbors. Initially, the
number of disputes were quite high from the late 50’s to 1965, but the technical capa-
bility did not follow. As a result, the development of ENR facilities was held in check.
It is important to recognize the increase in disputes following the Indo-Pakistani war
in 1971, alongside an increase in technical capabilities. With these increases, and the
second proliferation decision the development of ENR facilities increased from 1972
onwards. Thus once again, the development of ENR facilities does not rely on either
technical capabilities or motivations but instead a combination of both.
For this specific case, the predictive model does not capture certain aspects such
as proliferation decisions. This results from not specifying all potential variables,
which varies from case to case. As such compromises are made as to which variables
are key to recognizing ENR development. However, the predictive model does high-
light the three key phases behind India’s nuclear weapons program. Even though
the predictive model does not match the actual development of ENR facilities, it
highlights a different and more stable route to developing India’s weapons program.
Once again, the combination of technical capability and motivations are the driving
factor behind the predictive model.
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Figure 5.14: Data for India
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Figure 5.15: Geo-spatial results for Sweden (Tiered-EM)
The results from the EM case are far better than those found using the basic
model (see Figure 5.8). The results found in the predictive model with the EM
algorithm do not seem to differ much from the actual development except for sheer
magnitude.
Sweden was highly motivated to invested nuclear weapons research for deterrence
purposes. The technical capabilities for Sweden don’t seem to be driving factors
for either the results from the predictive model or the actual development of ENR
facilities. Once Sweden signed the NPT, they reached a deal with the USA to provide
materials that would kick start their civilian nuclear program. The drop in the
ENR facilities around 1972 occurs from the singing of the NPT. Nuclear electricity
production as well as the number of disputes Sweden had both decreased as a result.
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It is actually interesting to see this drop in disputes, as Sweden prescribed to political
non-alignment. Note that the NPT signing did not have an impact on the GDP Per
capita, in fact Sweden’s economy continued to grow as a result of further development
of a civilian nuclear program.
The predictive model uses the initial strength of the technical capabilities to sug-
gest that Sweden had the capability to have three ENR facilities. However, in reality
only one ENR facility was operational. Besides the difference in the magnitude, the
trends from the predictive model are identical to that of the actual development of
ENR facilities in Sweden.
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Figure 5.16: Data for Sweden
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5.2.3 Tiered Model: Sensitivity Analysis
A sensitivity analysis was performed to determine the effect data uncertainty
would have on the developed Bayesian networks. In order to assess data uncertainty,
a 25% decreased was placed upon the dataset provided. The 25% decrease was
specifically placed on the dependent variable (number of ENR facilities) before it was
discriminated (see Table A.3). After the dataset was altered, the same procedure
was followed to train and produce estimates from the tiered model. The models in
this case were also trained with the EM learning method as it was shown to be the
best
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Figure 5.17: Sensitivity Results for all Cases (Tiered-EM)
The Brazilian case tends to follow a very similar trend to that of the actual
number of ENR facilities Brazil had. Additionally, this 25% decrease in the actual
number is reflected in the predictive model as well, the magnitude of the predictive
model results are not larger than those of the actual number in any of the case
studies. This sensitivity analysis seems to have affected the predictive nature of the
model. Notice that the model does not capture the nuclear arsenal node, and the
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voluntary dismantlement of nuclear weapons. Errors in the dataset can affect the
driving factors in the predictive model.
More specifically, this sensitivity analysis highlights a complication. When plac-
ing this 25% decrease on the dependent variable, this affects the numerical value but
does not affect the categorical value. For example, the 25% decrease on a base of 10
facilities would translate in to 8 facilities, 7.5 to be exact. A state that has 6 to 11
facilities are both categorized in the medium-high range (refer to Table A.3). The
above example falls in the same categorical range. Future work should consider a
different approach for an uncertainty analysis.
Thus it is extremely important to select or develop a dataset appropriately. When
selecting a dataset ensure that it has been cross validated with multiple sources or
has been used extensively.
5.2.4 Tiered Model: Smoothed Results
Central limits (median,mode,mean) were used to smooth the data in three year
time frames based on the type of variable. The data was smoothed to test for
inconsistencies such as those one-year discrepancies found in the results of the basic
models (Figure 5.6 to 5.8).
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Figure 5.18: Smoothed Results for all Cases (Tiered-EM)
Immediately, we see some glaring errors. Both the Brazilian and Indian cases
produce identical results. Neither result matches the historical implications as well
as the actual number of ENR facilities these states had. However, these results do
make sense. When data is smoothed the inherent characteristics of the data change,
especially when each variable is smoothed with a different central limit. For example,
the dependent variable (number of ENR facilities) was smoothed based on the mode
of 3 year subsets; while one of the independent variables (GDP Per Capita) was
smoothed based on the mean of 3 year subsets.
Therefore different central limits applied to smooth each variable introduce un-
certainties in the model. These uncertainties seem to mask the predictive nature of
the model and affect the results obtained. Overall it is unnecessary to smooth data,
especially with studies associated with proliferation risk. This type of smoothing can
mask the intended effect expected from a model.
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5.2.5 Tiered Model: Expert Elicitation Results
An expert elicitation was conducted, as another method to obtain data for nodes
without data. In the Fuhrmann and Tkach dataset, both the Technical Capability
and Motivation nodes do not have data. Therefore, results from the expert elicitation
were used to develop conditional probabilities tables for the model. The expert
elicitation resulted in two CPTs, one for the Technical Capability node and another
for the Motivation node. A detailed explanation of the expert elicitation process can
be found in Appendix C.
After these CPTs were developed, the exact same procedure was used to create
visualizations for each state. Figure 5.19 compares results from the predictive model
(based on the expert elicitation) and the historical data.
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Figure 5.19: Expert Elicitation results for all cases
From Figure 5.19, it seems that the predictive model is much more conservative
than the historical data. This result is expected as knowledge based experts under-
stand both the failures and successes as a result of a weapons program. Experts as
a result will have more conservative answers to the elicitation.
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The expert elicitation based model does not capture the nuclear arsenal node,
which is highlighted in the South African case. In 1989, South Africa voluntarily dis-
mantled nuclear weapons. With regards to the Swedish case, the predictive model
follows an identical trend except between 1989 to 1991. This occurs due to the com-
bined increase in the following independent variables for Sweden: GDP Per Capita,
Nuclear electricity production and the number of disputes. These indicators affect
both the technical capability and motivation nodes, which could be a possible reason
for the increase in the estimated number of ENR facilities between 1989 to 1991
for Sweden. From the Indian case, it seems that motivations are just as much of a
driving factor as technical capabilities. The decrease in disputes between 1970 and
1980 seem to outweigh the technical capabilities when providing estimates. Note, in
Figure 5.13 the technical capabilities drive the estimation far more than any other
nodes.
From Figure 5.19, it seems that experts are more conservative in their approach
to assessing nuclear proliferation. Unfortunately, for these cases it does not seem to
match the historical data. A more extensive expert elicitation could mitigate issues
such as not capturing the nuclear arsenal node.
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6. FURTHER ANALYSIS
There are a few analysis steps required to ensure model specification, which incor-
porates structure and variable definition. After which, model verification is required
to determine its fit with the data. The additional analysis complements the case
studies as it evaluates specific statistics to determine model fit with the data.
First and foremost, it is important that model specification is studied. More
specifically, with Bayesian networks (Figure 4.1 and 4.2) it is important to assess
confidence between existing and non-existing links. The network structure was as-
sessed, with the use of a methodology previously developed by PNNL scientists. This
methodology results in graphical figures that depict dependence or independence of
Bayesian network nodes [46] [47].
Once model specification is ensured, the next step is model verification. Each
model was assessed based on its fit to the data, with the use of the correlation
statistic. There are occurrences where prediction accuracy is not a good measure for
model fit. This occurs because of drastically different dynamic relationships between
nodes for each tested state. As a result the correlation statistics is used to capture
how accurate the predictive model results are. the correlation coefficient is calculated
both on the model and state levels, between the predictive results and “truth” data, in
this case the Fuhrmann and Tkach dataset. Even though other metrics could be used,
the correlation coefficient provides insight on how well predictive models estimated
the number of ENR facilities over time (with respect to trends and magnitude). The
prediction accuracy is also reported for each model for reference purposes.
6.1 Model Analysis
Model specification is required for the tiered model, as it introduces links be-
tween independent variables and also incorporates the use of two intermediate nodes
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(Technical Capability and Motivations). Please refer to Figure 4.2 for the Tiered
model, regardless of the learning method used. Note that when testing variable re-
lationships, it is important to test those that are specified in the model as well as
those that don’t exist. The following variable relationships were tested:
• Disputes and Rivals,
• Disputes and Superpower Alliance,
• GDP Per Capita and Nuclear Electricity Production,
• GDP Per Capita and Superpower Alliance,
• Nuclear Electricity Production and Nuclear Arsenal,
• Nuclear Electricity Production and Trading Partner(s),
• Nuclear Arsenal and GDP Per Capita, and
• Nuclear Arsenal and Trading Partner(s).
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Figure 6.1: Diagnostic Graph for Nuclear Arsenal and Trading Partner
Figure 6.1 depicts the interdependence between Nuclear Arsenal and Trading
partners. Based on literature review, prior to model development, these two nodes
were to be dependent upon one another. It suggests that the presence of a Nuclear
Arsenal would affect the trading partners a state would have.
To decipher Figure 6.1 it is important to recognize the null hypothesis along with
characteristics of the diagnostic graph. The null hypothesis is that the two variables
tested are independent of one another. These diagnostic plots show pairwise compar-
isons of the empirical probability two states of one variable given a particular state of
another variable. In Figure 6.1, each row corresponds to a specific state of the Trad-
ing Partner node. The corresponding yellow and blue bars represent the observed
states of the Nuclear Arsenal variable (No Weapons v. Weapons, respectively). The
length of each bar is dependent upon the number of times these combination of states
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occurs in the provided dataset.
If two variables are independent, each pair of bars are to be symmetric about x
intercept. Alongside the yellow and blue bars, each row has a point estimate indicated
with a black point. These point estimates have an accompanying confidence interval,
represented by a red or green color over the black point. Confidence intervals will be
green, when they intersect the x-intercept and red otherwise. If a confidence interval
does not intersect with the x-intercept, then the variables are dependent. Thus with
this background information, reviewing Figure 6.1 shows that these two variables are
dependent. Beside the “none” state for Trading Partner, confidence intervals for all
other states do not intersect the x-intercept. As a result, this test rejects the null
hypothesis.
To find all of the diagnostic graphs, see Appendix B. Figure 6.2 shows the diag-
nostic dependence between Nuclear Electricity Production and Trading Partners.
Figure 6.2: Diagnostic Graph for Nuclear Electricity Production and Trading Partner
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For this case, the graph observes all four states for Nuclear Electricity Produc-
tion with respect to the four states of the Trading Partner node. The code used
is instructed to develop an even number of graphs on both sides of the axis, hence
why the high node is repeated three times. This repetition has no bearing on anal-
ysis. From Figure 6.2, the pairwise combination between “Low” and “High” states
for Nuclear Electricity production depict that these two variables are independent.
However to fail to reject the null hypothesis, this must occur for all state pairings
which it doesn’t. Therefore, in this case these variables are also dependent. The
network, seen in Figure 4.2, shows that Nuclear Electricity Production feeds into the
Trading Partner node.
For further dependence analysis, see Appendix B (Figures B.1 to B.6).
There are a few metrics presented that will ensure model verification. As stated
above, the correlation statistics and the predication accuracy will be studied to ensure
the model represents the provided dataset to the best of its ability. Besides assessing
the model with respect to results, the components of the models must also be studied.
The correlation coefficient represents a quantitative measure of dependent be-
tween a set of values. The correlation value identifies the strength of a linear rela-
tionship between two chosen variables. In this case, the two sets of values are results
from the predictive model and the actual number of ENR facilities from the Fuhrman
and Tkach dataset. This coefficient will be tested for each model to identify the best
model. This correlation coefficient ranges from -1 to 1. If the coefficient is 1, then
the there is a very strong linear relationship between the two variables chosen. If
the coefficient is 0, then there is no linear relationship between the two, and finally
if the coefficient is -1, then there is a negative linear relationship between the two.
Prediction accuracy is a percentage value that is displayed as a decimal in Table 6.1.
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The higher the decimal value the more accurate the model in guessing exact values
per year.
Table 6.1: Model Type Analysis
Model Type Correlation Prediction Accuracy
Basic Model 0.45 0.39
Tiered Model (EM) 0.78 0.06
Tiered Model (Gradient) 0.50 0.14
Expert Elicitation Model 0.40 0.05
The Basic Model provides the most accurate results, according to the prediction
accuracy reported. The tiered model, regardless of learning method, introduces two
intermediate (classifier) nodes for which there is no definite data. As a result, the EM
and Gradient descent methods were used to train the model appropriately. These
intermediate nodes introduces some uncertainty as the conditional probability tables
developed are not from definite data. They are based on the parent nodes and an
expected convergence term. Another option was to use expert knowledge to develop
the necessary CPTs for the intermediate nodes. The correlation statistic however
deems this to be poor in comparison to other methods. It must be noted that
the experts consulted seem to take a conservative approach to proliferation, which
probably affected the results in comparison to the historical data.
The correlation values shown in Table 6.1 represent the overall comparison be-
tween the estimated results and the actual number of ENR facilities. However, to get
a better understanding of the strength of these estimations histograms were devel-
oped. The data for the histograms represents correlation coefficients and prediction
accuracy per state. The red line on the correlation coefficient histogram represents
the median value.
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Figure 6.3: Data for Basic Model
From Figure 6.3, the basic model has respectable predication accuracy results.
However, the median correlation coefficient sits at about -0.04. This suggest that
there is no relationship between the sets of data. It is important to recognize the
purpose of the basic model. It was used to determine whether the appropriate
variables were identified to measure the number of ENR facilities.
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Figure 6.4: Data for EM Model
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Figure 6.5: Data for Gradient Model
Figures 6.4 and 6.5 allow for comparison between the two learning methods. Note
that the EM learning method is primarily used when data is missing, as is this case
with the intermediate nodes. The gradient descent method is primarily used to fine
tune models after they are initially trained. From the right side of each figure, we
see that gradient descent model has better prediction accuracy results. However,
prediction accuracy can not be used as an appropriate measure to assess the model
as both have over 20 cases with a 0% accuracy. The left side of each figure indicates
that the median correlation coefficient is slightly higher for the EM model than it is
for the gradient descent model. The overall correlation coefficient for the EM model
(as shown in Table 6.1) is 0.78, while the median correlation coefficient is 0.40. The
gradient descent model has a overall correlation coefficient of 0.50, while the median
correlation coefficient is 0.35. It is important to study both results as the individual
correlation coefficient can be found to be NA, since the actual data suggested that
there were no ENR facilities for that state. This is not a calculation error but instead
just a result of the correlation calculation and the data provided.
74
For the state specific correlation values and prediction accuracy, please refer to
Table 6.2. Note that the Indian case had the best correlation coefficient, while the
South African case had the best predication accuracy, regardless of model type. It
is also noteworthy to recognize the drastically different correlation coefficient results
for the Swedish case.
Therefore these results confirm that the EM method is the learning method of
choice when developing advanced models such as the tiered model. This analysis
provides confidence in the EM method results, shown in Section 5.
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Table 6.2: Case Specific Analysis
Country
Basic Model EM Model Gradient Model
Correlation Prediction Accuracy Correlation Prediction Accuracy Correlation Prediction Accuracy
Brazil 0.12 0.28 0.52 0.19 0.52 0.09
India 0.88 0.02 0.90 0.11 0.87 0.22
Sweden 0.46 0.24 0.53 0.00 0.23 0.24
South Africa 0.64 0.36 0.61 0.28 0.68 0.33
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7. CONCLUSIONS
Different Bayesian network models were developed to estimate the correlates of
nuclear proliferation and nuclear energy. This study measured correlates as the
number of Enrichment and Reprocessing facilities a state has. The work on geo-
spatial factors and correlates in Fuhrmann and Tkach complemented this study.
Results from the most refined model, in this case the tiered model with an EM
learning method, produced estimations for the number of ENR facilities a given state
has. These estimations compared reasonably well with the historical data, based
on correlation coefficients and predication accuracy metrics. Estimates from other
models did not perform as well as the tiered model with an EM learning method.
However, these models all produced similar trends to those found in the historical
data categorized by the Fuhrmann and Tkach for nearly all countries during 1945-
2010.
It is possible to further refine these models such that there is better agreement
between estimates and the historical data. This falls in line with the common un-
derstanding that proliferation decisions are quite complex and must be studied on
a case by case basis. This limits potential for research to verify historical data and
potentially forecast the future.
Based on the results from this study, learning methods associated with Bayesian
networks have shown to effectively estimate proliferation indicators. The learning
methods were much more favorable than the results of the expert elicitation. One of
the many pitfalls with expert elicitation is the potential bias that can be introduced.
An unforeseen bias in this elicitation process was the conservative approach shown by
experts. This conservative approach taken by experts resulted in drastically different
estimates than seen in the other models. A more detailed expert elicitation could
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avoid such bias.
From the results and analysis seen in Chapters 5 and 6, the overall goal was met.
This specific study used the number of ENR facilities as a proliferation indicator. The
models did fairly well to represent independent variables related to nuclear history,
as long as these variables were accompanied with data. There are algorithms that
can be used to account for missing data, this is only recommended when there are
a few missing variables. It is highly recommended to develop models for which data
is present or easily accessible. In addition the majority of the objectives were also
fulfilled. However, the results from the sensitivity analysis suggest that future work
needs to be considered, for this specific objective. This study also provided insight
on the use of Bayesian Networks in nuclear weapons proliferation research. From
the work conducted, Bayesian Networks seem to be an appropriate tool to measure
nuclear weapons proliferation especially considering the dynamic nature of both the
NFC and nuclear weapons proliferation.
7.1 Future Work
With these types of studies there are several possible areas for future work. The
first obvious realization is to further specify the networks developed. In order to do
this, the appropriate dataset must also be chosen. The model can only be further
specified if data exists. If it is feasible, data verification is recommended. However,
this is not feasible in most cases as datasets will be upwards of 2,000 lines or more.
Even though the Bayesian network software (Netica) utilized provided inherent
cross-validation methods, it is important to have large datasets. These large datasets
can be split into testing and training data, which can allow the user to preselect the
cross-validation method. This could prevent the need for a learning method algo-
rithm such as the EM or gradient descent methods discussed in this study. Another
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option to prevent the need for learning method algorithms is the use of expert elicita-
tions. A larger sample size for the expert elicitation should produce highly correlated
results with the historical dataset. Larger sample sizes should remove any bias such
as the conservative proliferation estimates seen in Figure 5.19.
Alongside this, it would be pivotal to estimate the total ENR capacity a state
has. This type of measurement would delineate the difference between 10 laboratory
facilities and 3 commercial facilities. In order to complete this exact study with
capacity instead of the sheer magnitude, a dataset would need to be developed.
Unfortunately, capacity data for ENR facilities is not widely accessible for states
currently or historically as this may or may not be confidential information.
A more rigorous uncertainty quantification would provide more insight to the
model. The discrete states in each node created some issues when carrying out an
uncertainty test. With the current model, an impactful uncertainty analysis would
require testing a 50% decrease on the dependent variable.
The current Bayesian Network has the ability to forecast. However, there are
some flaws such as the sensitivity and the need to account for various other indicators.
A more refined model will have the capability to forecast more accurately and the
potential to be used as a policy tool.
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APPENDIX A
ADDITIONAL MODEL DEVELOPMENT
A.1 STATE DISCRETIZATION
Table A.1: Data Discrimination Part 1
GDP Per Capita Nuclear Electricity Production
Low x <= 5.64 -6.21 <= x < 0
Medium-Low 5.64 < x < 8 0 <= x < 2
Medium-High 8 <= x < 10 2 <= x < 6
High 10 <= x 6 <= x
Table A.2: Data Discrimination Part 2
ENR Facilities held by Trading Partners ENR Facilities held by Rivals
None x = 0 x = 0
Low 1 < x < 25 1 <= x < 15
Medium 25 <= x < 60 15 <= x < 27
High 60 <= x 27 <= x
Table A.3: Dependent Variable Discrimination
Number of ENR Facilities
None x = 0
Low 1 <= x < 3
Medium-Low 3 <= x < 6
Medium-High 6 <= x < 11
High 11 <= x
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Table A.4: Binary Variable Discrimination
Super Power Alliance Nuclear Arsenal
Yes x = 1 x = 1
No x = 0 x = 0
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A.2 CONDITIONAL PROBABILITY TABLES
Table A.5: CPT for Technical Capability
Trading Partners GDP Per Capita Nuclear Elec Production Nuclear Arsenal Technical Capability
Low Medium High
None Low Low Weapons 41.6669 36.6665 21.6666
None Low Low No Weapons 56.6668 26.1666 17.1666
None Low Medium-Low Weapons 36.6669 41.6665 21.6666
None Low Medium-Low No Weapons 78.9693 15.4514 5.57923
None Low Medium-High Weapons 24.1667 49.1667 26.6667
None Low Medium-High No Weapons 46.6667 31.6667 21.6667
None Low High Weapons 21.6667 56.6667 21.6667
None Low High No Weapons 36.6667 26.6667 36.6667
None Medium-Low Low Weapons 26.9614 32.5483 40.4903
None Medium-Low Low No Weapons 51.058 34.3454 14.5965
None Medium-Low Medium-Low Weapons 20.8313 36.7818 42.3869
None Medium-Low Medium-Low No Weapons 67.6652 26.0564 6.27838
None Medium-Low Medium-High Weapons 5.64101 36.7495 57.6095
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None Medium-Low Medium-High No Weapons 44.1667 34.1667 21.6667
None Medium-Low High Weapons 21.6667 54.1667 24.1667
None Medium-Low High No Weapons 34.1667 34.1667 31.6667
None Medium-High Low Weapons 18.4484 20.0073 61.5443
None Medium-High Low No Weapons 45.2268 42.0033 12.7699
None Medium-High Medium-Low Weapons 15.1008 39.5449 45.3543
None Medium-High Medium-Low No Weapons 55.9988 30.715 13.2862
None Medium-High Medium-High Weapons 6.50257 36.3525 57.1449
None Medium-High Medium-High No Weapons 58.6354 33.9959 7.36869
None Medium-High High Weapons 21.6667 49.1667 29.1667
None Medium-High High No Weapons 31.6667 31.6667 36.6667
None High Low Weapons 33.1667 33.1667 33.6667
None High Low No Weapons 41.6667 34.1667 24.1667
None High Medium-Low Weapons 29.1667 41.6667 29.1667
None High Medium-Low No Weapons 64.2685 24.4584 11.2731
None High Medium-High Weapons 21.6667 41.6667 36.6667
None High Medium-High No Weapons 56.5239 31.076 12.4001
None High High Weapons 5.62013 39.5197 54.8602
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None High High No Weapons 31.6667 31.6667 36.6667
Low Low Low Weapons 39.1667 39.1667 21.6667
Low Low Low No Weapons 59.1667 23.6667 17.1667
Low Low Medium-Low Weapons 34.1667 41.6667 24.1667
Low Low Medium-Low No Weapons 46.6667 31.6667 21.6667
Low Low Medium-High Weapons 21.6667 51.6667 26.6667
Low Low Medium-High No Weapons 44.1667 34.1667 21.6667
Low Low High Weapons 21.6667 51.6667 26.6667
Low Low High No Weapons 36.6667 31.6667 31.6667
Low Medium-Low Low Weapons 36.6667 39.1667 24.1667
Low Medium-Low Low No Weapons 51.6667 26.6667 21.6667
Low Medium-Low Medium-Low Weapons 31.6667 41.6667 26.6667
Low Medium-Low Medium-Low No Weapons 55.6805 37.5526 6.76693
Low Medium-Low Medium-High Weapons 21.6667 44.1667 34.1667
Low Medium-Low Medium-High No Weapons 44.1667 31.6667 24.1667
Low Medium-Low High Weapons 21.6667 51.6667 26.6667
Low Medium-Low High No Weapons 31.6667 36.6667 31.6667
Low Medium-High Low Weapons 22.7548 35.1215 42.1237
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Low Medium-High Low No Weapons 44.1667 31.6667 24.1667
Low Medium-High Medium-Low Weapons 13.2408 36.837 49.9222
Low Medium-High Medium-Low No Weapons 56.1468 32.8916 10.9616
Low Medium-High Medium-High Weapons 5.46722 23.1091 71.4237
Low Medium-High Medium-High No Weapons 62.2589 32.1348 5.60637
Low Medium-High High Weapons 21.6667 46.6667 31.6667
Low Medium-High High No Weapons 31.6667 36.6667 31.6667
Low High Low Weapons 29.1667 36.6667 34.1667
Low High Low No Weapons 39.1667 36.6667 24.1667
Low High Medium-Low Weapons 26.6667 41.6667 31.6667
Low High Medium-Low No Weapons 39.1667 31.6667 29.1667
Low High Medium-High Weapons 21.6667 36.6667 41.6667
Low High Medium-High No Weapons 61.8232 29.2126 8.96422
Low High High Weapons 21.6667 46.6667 31.6667
Low High High No Weapons 31.6667 36.6667 31.6667
Medium Low Low Weapons 36.6667 39.1667 24.1667
Medium Low Low No Weapons 56.6667 24.1667 19.1667
Medium Low Medium-Low Weapons 31.6667 41.6667 26.6667
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Medium Low Medium-Low No Weapons 44.1667 31.6667 24.1667
Medium Low Medium-High Weapons 21.6667 46.6667 31.6667
Medium Low Medium-High No Weapons 41.6667 34.1667 24.1667
Medium Low High Weapons 21.6667 44.1667 34.1667
Medium Low High No Weapons 31.6667 36.6667 31.6667
Medium Medium-Low Low Weapons 36.6667 36.6667 26.6667
Medium Medium-Low Low No Weapons 41.6667 31.6667 26.6667
Medium Medium-Low Medium-Low Weapons 31.6667 36.6667 31.6667
Medium Medium-Low Medium-Low No Weapons 41.6667 34.1667 24.1667
Medium Medium-Low Medium-High Weapons 21.6667 41.6667 36.6667
Medium Medium-Low Medium-High No Weapons 44.1667 31.6667 24.1667
Medium Medium-Low High Weapons 21.6667 46.6667 31.6667
Medium Medium-Low High No Weapons 26.6667 41.6667 31.6667
Medium Medium-High Low Weapons 31.6667 31.6667 36.6667
Medium Medium-High Low No Weapons 55.4359 33.3438 11.2203
Medium Medium-High Medium-Low Weapons 11.2678 43.2715 45.4608
Medium Medium-High Medium-Low No Weapons 58.445 28.9084 12.6466
Medium Medium-High Medium-High Weapons 5.95907 19.119 74.9219
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Medium Medium-High Medium-High No Weapons 48.5147 39.1882 12.2971
Medium Medium-High High Weapons 21.6667 41.6667 36.6667
Medium Medium-High High No Weapons 31.6667 31.6667 36.6667
Medium High Low Weapons 26.6667 39.1667 34.1667
Medium High Low No Weapons 36.6667 39.1667 24.1667
Medium High Medium-Low Weapons 26.6667 41.6667 31.6667
Medium High Medium-Low No Weapons 28.9438 52.1813 18.8749
Medium High Medium-High Weapons 6.4416 20.8257 72.7327
Medium High Medium-High No Weapons 60.7596 26.2204 13.0201
Medium High High Weapons 7.52629 39.2742 53.1996
Medium High High No Weapons 26.6667 36.6667 36.6667
High Low Low Weapons 31.6667 41.6667 26.6667
High Low Low No Weapons 51.6667 26.6667 21.6667
High Low Medium-Low Weapons 31.6667 36.6667 31.6667
High Low Medium-Low No Weapons 41.6667 31.6667 26.6667
High Low Medium-High Weapons 21.6667 41.6667 36.6667
High Low Medium-High No Weapons 41.6667 31.6667 26.6667
High Low High Weapons 21.6667 41.6667 36.6667
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High Low High No Weapons 29.1667 39.1667 31.6667
High Medium-Low Low Weapons 34.1667 39.1667 26.6667
High Medium-Low Low No Weapons 39.1667 34.1667 26.6667
High Medium-Low Medium-Low Weapons 29.1667 39.1667 31.6667
High Medium-Low Medium-Low No Weapons 39.1667 36.6667 24.1667
High Medium-Low Medium-High Weapons 26.6667 39.1667 34.1667
High Medium-Low Medium-High No Weapons 41.6667 34.1667 24.1667
High Medium-Low High Weapons 21.6667 44.1667 34.1667
High Medium-Low High No Weapons 24.1667 44.1667 31.6667
High Medium-High Low Weapons 26.6667 31.6667 41.6667
High Medium-High Low No Weapons 31.6667 36.6667 31.6667
High Medium-High Medium-Low Weapons 24.1667 36.6667 39.1667
High Medium-High Medium-Low No Weapons 37.2156 45.2321 17.5523
High Medium-High Medium-High Weapons 21.6667 29.1667 49.1667
High Medium-High Medium-High No Weapons 34.1667 36.6667 29.1667
High Medium-High High Weapons 21.6667 36.6667 41.6667
High Medium-High High No Weapons 26.6667 34.1667 39.1667
High High Low Weapons 21.6667 39.1667 39.1667
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High High Low No Weapons 31.6667 39.1667 29.1667
High High Medium-Low Weapons 21.6667 36.6667 41.6667
High High Medium-Low No Weapons 31.6667 36.6667 31.6667
High High Medium-High Weapons 21.6667 31.6667 46.6667
High High Medium-High No Weapons 31.6667 36.6667 31.6667
High High High Weapons 21.6667 26.6667 51.6667
High High High No Weapons 26.6667 31.6667 41.6667
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A.3 GRADIENT METHOD RESULTS
Figure A.1: Geo-spatial results for RSA (Tiered-Gradient)
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Figure A.2: Geo-spatial results for Brazil (Tiered-Gradient)
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Figure A.3: Geo-spatial results for India (Tiered-Gradient)
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Figure A.4: Geo-spatial results for Sweden (Tiered-Gradient)
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APPENDIX B
CONDITIONAL INDEPENDENCE
B.1 DIAGNOSTICS GRAPHS
Figure B.1: Diagnostic Graph for Disputes and Rivals
Figure B.2: Diagnostic Graph for Disputes and Superpower Alliance
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Figure B.3: Diagnostic Graph for GDP Per Capita and Nuclear Electricity Produc-
tion
Figure B.4: Diagnostic Graph for GDP Per Capita and Superpower Alliance
Figure B.5: Diagnostic Graph for Nuclear Arsenal and GDP Per Capita
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Figure B.6: Diagnostic Graph for Nuclear Electricity Production and Superpower
Alliance
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APPENDIX C
EXPERT ELICITATION
C.1 METHODOLOGY
The expert elicitation asked 18 questions regarding the indicators and structure
of the tiered model. Definitions of the indicators were provided, they are as follows:
• ENR: Enrichment and Reprocessing (facilities)
• ENR facilities held by Trading Partners: The total number of ENR
facilities held by all trading partners of a state.
• ENR facilities held by Rivals: The total number of ENR facilities held by
all rivals of a state.
• Superpower Alliance: A political alliance with a superpower. States under
a nuclear umbrella may value ENR technology less because they can rely on
other states for protection.
• Nuclear Arsenal: States with a nuclear weapons program and more than one
nuclear weapon.
• Technical Capability: Represents a states measure of technical expertise,
monetary funds, and resources specifically geared towards the construction of
ENR facilities.
• Motivation: Represents a states desire or ambition to construct ENR facili-
ties.
• # Of Disputes: The number of disputes a State has with other recognized
States. A dispute is defined as threatening, displaying or using force against
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other state.
Following definitions a list of questions, on a five point likert scale, were devel-
oped. These questions aimed to understand an experts thought process on nuclear
proliferation. An example can be seen below:
Figure C.1: Example Question from the Expert Elicitation
Based on Figure C.1, the expert has selected the boldfaced and underlined option
as the response to the question. This question aims to gage the effect superpower
alliance has on motivations. The tiered model in Figure 4.2 highlights the edge
between these two nodes. Similar to this question, other questions are asked to
assess all the links represented in Figure 4.2 for both the technical capability and
motivation nodes.
The result of each response is coded in an alpha value for that specific node. Alpha
values are coded to be between 0 and 1. For example, in Figure C.1, the response
has an associated alpha value of 0.7. After all the alpha values are collected, CPTs
are developed. The alpha values between all the states were averaged. Note that the
mode and median of these values resulted in the same value, this might occur due
to the small sample size. A very basic example of how the alpha values were used to
develop a CPT can be seen in Table C.1.
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Table C.1: Example Conditional Probability Table
Motivation
Superpower Alliance High Low
TRUE alpha 1-alpha
FALSE 1-alpha alpha
CPTs for the technical capability and motivation nodes were developed by devel-
oping similar tables. These tables had three to four parent nodes on the left hand side
of the table dictating, very similar to that of Table A.5. These CPTs were formed
based on the alpha values derived from the expert elicitation. Following develop-
ment, the CPTs were trained on the Bayesian networks to add an expert elicitation
flair to the predictive nature of the network.
This concluded the model development with the use of an expert elicitation.
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C.2 FURTHER ANALYSIS
Figure C.2 identifies the correlation and predication accuracy plots for the expert
elicitation method.
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Figure C.2: Data for Expert Elicitation Model
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